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What makes 
people happy? 
What makes people happy? Nearly 
20 years ago, the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) organised its first
conference on this question under the
title ‘Happiness at LSE’. Since then,
understanding wellbeing – and what
practical actions might be taken to
promote it – have been a central part of
the Centre’s research agenda. At the
same time, promoting happiness has
increasingly been seen in some
government circles as a legitimate
ambition of public policy alongside the
more traditional goals of supporting
economic growth and employment.
In this issue of CentrePiece, CEP’s
founder director Richard Layard outlines
the development of happiness research 
at LSE and its interactions with policy:
‘the main aim of social science should be
to throw light on the conditions
conducive to happiness’, he concludes.
Two further articles look at the
relationships between people’s working
environments and their wellbeing, and
between crime in a local area and 
the mental health of both victims and
non-victims.
There is much more about wellbeing
on our website, including recordings of a
public debate between Lord Layard and
his fellow peer Robert Skidelsky on
whether happiness is the right measure
of social progress, and of the two latest
events to celebrate the Centre’s 21st
birthday. Former CEP researcher Andrew
Oswald gave a fascinating lecture on
herd behaviour and the phenomenon 
of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’; and
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman
discussed his acclaimed new book,
Thinking Fast and Slow.
Elsewhere in this magazine are
several topical pieces. Henry Overman
questions the UK government’s decision
to go ahead with HS2, the new high-
speed rail line. Iftikhar Hussain
summarises his evidence that the Ofsted
inspection system has proved effective in
raising educational standards in England.
And Nicholas Bloom argues that weak
economic growth in Europe and the
United States is in part due to
heightened uncertainty about economic
policy-making.
CEP researchers are also deeply
involved in a new initiative launched in
January: the LSE Growth Commission.
Co-chairs Tim Besley and CEP’s director
John Van Reenen outline its aims thus:
‘Even in times of slow growth and
protracted economic turbulence, it is
essential to stay focused on the key
drivers of prosperity over the long term.
The LSE Growth Commission will use
frontier research to provide a framework
for policy-making in the UK to support
sustainable growth.’ How the growth
agenda fits with the happiness agenda
will be an interesting challenge for
researchers and policy-makers.
Romesh Vaitilingam, Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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In the latest of CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series, Richard Layard
outlines the development of the Centre’s research on
what makes people happy and how society might best be
organised to promote happiness.
Big ideas
Wellbeing and
public policy
CentrePiece Winter 2011/12 
3
H
ow can we maximise
people’s happiness and
which institutions, policies
and norms will best achieve
this goal? It was to answer this question
that the subject of economics was
developed – and it was why I became 
an economist. 
Economics has done a great deal to
improve the human lot. But unfortunately
it has had too narrow a view of the
sources of happiness and misery – too
focused on the standard of living. This
became obvious nearly 40 years ago when
Richard Easterlin pointed to the survey
evidence that despite massive rises in
living standards, happiness was not
increasing (Easterlin, 1974). He attributed
this to the fact that people compare their
income with other people’s incomes and
with their own recent experience.
In 1980, I wrote an article about the
policy implications if that were true
(Layard, 1980). At that time, there was
virtually no evidence about the
determinants of happiness. Over the last
30 years, all that has changed and there is
now a vigorous infant science of
happiness. At the same time, we have had
the continuing experience of ever rising
incomes associated with no increase in
happiness in the UK and several other
countries, including Germany and the
United States.
From these two influences – the
science and the popular experience – has
emerged a major worldwide movement to
establish subjective wellbeing as the
accepted goal of public policy. Pioneers of
this movement have been the OECD, the
French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the
UK’s prime minister David Cameron. 
CEP researchers have also played an
important part. In the 1990s, Andrew
Oswald (who is now at the University of
Warwick) pioneered the analysis of micro-
data (including from the then newly
established British Household Panel
Survey) where the outcome of interest was
happiness. He made an enormous impact
by using international surveys, such as
Eurobarometer, to show how similar were
the quantitative effects of bad
experiences, such as unemployment and
bereavement, in different countries
(Oswald, 1997).
Much of Andrew Oswald’s work was
done with David Blanchflower and
Andrew Clark, and all three have become
major figures in the field. He also
organised CEP’s first conference on
happiness in November 1993, where the
participants included Daniel Kahneman, a
psychologist who a decade later received
the Nobel prize for economics, and two
other psychologists, Peter Warr and Kamal
Birdi from the University of Sheffield. At
that time, it was rare for economists and
psychologists to work together.
In 2005, I wrote a book on happiness,
now in its second edition, in which I tried
to juxtapose the philosophical arguments
in favour of wellbeing with the evidence
on its causes – and thus derive some
important policy implications (Layard,
2011). The book has sold over 150,000
copies in 20 languages. From it has
followed the Centre’s research programme
on wellbeing, designed to push forward
our understanding but also to produce
practical action. We can begin with the
practical action.
The first area here has been mental
health. By analysing data on a typical
group of adults (participants in the 1970
British Cohort Survey, when they were 34
years old in 2004), it is possible to explain
their reported levels of happiness and
misery. The results show that mental
health eight years earlier explains four
times as much of the misery in our society
as does the level of current family income.
Mental illness also has massive economic
costs, putting over one million people
onto incapacity benefits.
According to another survey, the
national Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, one
in six adults would be diagnosed as
suffering from clinical depression or
crippling anxiety disorders, but only 25%
of these are in treatment, compared with
nearly 100% for most physical illnesses.
This is shocking – not only because of the
avoidable human misery but also because,
as one of our studies shows, if cognitive
behavioural therapy (CBT) were made
generally available, it would pay for itself
through savings on incapacity benefits and
lost taxes (Layard et al, 2007).
That 2007 paper was written with
LSE’s Martin Knapp, the UK’s leading
expert on the economics of mental health,
and David Clark of the Institute of
Psychiatry at King’s College, who is one of
the world’s leading experts on CBT. To
improve things, we formed the LSE Mental
Health Policy Group, which in 2006
produced The Depression Report. This
included the proposal to train up to
10,000 therapists in the UK to deliver
effective therapy services in the NHS 
(CEP, 2006).
The government essentially accepted
our proposals and they are now being
rolled out nationally as the Improving
Access to Psychological Therapy
Programme (IAPT) over a six-year period
(2008-14). David Clark and I are actively
involved as advisers to the programme,
and have published two evaluations 
of it, (Clark et al, 2009; Gyani et al, 
2011) – one on the two pilots and one 
on the first year of roll-out – which
confirm the soundness of our original
cost-benefit analysis.
In its original form, the programme
covered only adults and not children. But
in 2007, I became a member of the Good
Childhood Enquiry and was co-author of
its final report (Layard and Dunn, 2009).
One key chapter was on child mental
health, where, with Stephen Scott of
King’s College, we developed the proposal
for an IAPT programme for children. 
The government has accepted a version of
our proposal and the programme begins
in 2012.
It would obviously be better to prevent
mental illness than to have to cure it once
it has developed. Fortunately, there are
now many programmes for school children
The main aim of
social science
should be to
throw light on
the conditions
conducive to
happiness
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that attempt to do that and have 
shown significant results. One of the 
best known is the Penn Resiliency
Programme, developed at the University
of Pennsylvania using the basic ideas 
that underlie CBT.
With the help of the Young
Foundation and the Local Government
Association, we found three local
authorities that were interested in 
piloting the programme in England.
Altogether 22 schools participated and
the programme was found to reduce the
incidence of teenage depression
significantly, especially for those most at
risk (Challen et al, 2011).
Over 60 schools now use the
programme, and more and more staff are
being trained through the mechanism we
initiated. But the programme is quite
short: it takes 18 hours per pupil. To
achieve a more substantial impact requires
many more hours.
In the UK, most secondary school
children spend one hour a week for five
years on ‘personal, social and health
education’ (PSHE), most of which
probably has no effect. Even the most
structured programme of ‘social and
emotional aspects of learning’ (SEAL) in
secondary schools has been shown to
have no effect (Humphrey et al, 2010). To
replace this ineffective method, we have
trawled through all the world’s best
programmes and constructed an
evidence-based curriculum for 
140 hours, which we are hoping, with
government backing, to pilot shortly
(Layard et al, 2011). 
Having a job is a key element of
wellbeing, so we have continued to press
two of the Centre’s oldest ideas – the
apprenticeship guarantee (now an object
of government policy) and a limit to life
on unemployment benefits. As the
recession began, Paul Gregg and I
designed what we called the Job
Guarantee (Gregg and Layard, 2009),
which the Labour government
implemented as the Future Jobs Fund.
Despite favourable evaluations, this has
now been abolished.
But perhaps our biggest, and least
effortful, success has been on the national
measurement of wellbeing. In 2008, the
Office for National Statistics decided to
have some work on this and
commissioned me, Robert Metcalfe of the
University of Oxford and Paul Dolan, a
wellbeing economist recently appointed
to an LSE chair in social policy, to advise
them (Dolan et al, 2011).
Our proposed questions (see box) are
now being asked of 200,000 people in
the government’s Integrated Household
Survey, and the answers will appear
regularly in the country’s official statistics.
Through the mediation of the OECD,
most advanced countries can be expected
to follow suit.
There have of course been intellectual
challenges to the wellbeing movement. To
promote understanding of our viewpoint,
we sponsored a major collaborative
conference on happiness and public policy,
the papers from which were published as
a special issue of the Journal of Public
Economics (Besley and Saez, 2008). In it,
two colleagues and I investigated the rate
at which the marginal utility of income
declines as people get richer. We found
that marginal utility is inversely
proportional to income – an old idea
going back to the eighteenth century
mathematician Daniel Bernoulli, but never
before directly investigated.
More recently, some distinguished
authors have questioned Richard Easterlin’s
original hypothesis. But in one paper, we
were able to show that at least in the UK,
the United States and West Germany,
average happiness has not grown while
average real income has shot up. The key
reason is that people mainly value their
income in relation to the income of others,
just as Easterlin first suggested (Layard et
al, 2010).
We are now embarking on a major
systematic study of wellbeing over the life
course, with three aims. The first is to
build a comprehensive model that really
shows how much different factors matter.
The second is to disentangle the true
Evaluation of
much of
government
policy could 
be undertaken
with happiness
being the
criterion of
benefit
Integrated Household
Survey questions on
subjective wellbeing 
I would like to ask you four questions about
your feelings on aspects of your life. There
are no right or wrong answers. For each of
these questions I’d like you to give an
answer on a scale of nought to 10, where
nought is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘completely’.
1. Overall, how satisfied are you 
with your life nowadays?
2. Overall, to what extent do you 
feel that the things you do in your 
life are worthwhile?
3. Overall, how happy did you 
feel yesterday?
4. Overall, how anxious did you 
feel yesterday?
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of Public Economics special issue
CEP (2006) The Depression Report: A New
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Paul Gregg and Richard Layard (2009) 
‘A Job Guarantee’, CEP mimeo
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new/staff/
layard/pdf/001JGProposal-16-03-09.pdf)
Alex Gyani, Roz Shafran, Richard Layard and
David Clark (2011) Enhancing Recovery
Rates in IAPT Services: Lessons from
Analysis of the Year One Data
(http://www.iapt.nhs.uk/silo/files/enhancing-
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causal effects of people’s experiences by
properly controlling for genetic influences.
And the third is to use the findings,
combined with experimental evidence, to
show how policy evaluation of much of
government policy could be undertaken
with happiness, rather than willingness-to-
pay, being the criterion of benefit.
In my view, the wellbeing movement is
unstoppable. Happiness is the only good
that is self-evidently that, a ‘good’ – and
we are coming to know more and more
about the conditions that make us happy
or otherwise. But there is a long way to
go and the main aim of social science
should be to throw light on the conditions
conducive to happiness and the ways in
which those conditions can be produced.
The CEP and the LSE are the obvious
focal point for this work. We are proud of
what we have done, grateful to those
who have financed us (especially the
Esmée Fairbairn Foundation) and impatient
to push further with more complete
models of wellbeing over the individual
life course. London is a great place for all
this, with the fruitful interaction of
economists, psychologists and psychiatrists
that we experience in our seminars. I have
no doubt that happiness and wellbeing
will become more and more central
concepts in our culture – and in labour
economics, where so many of us began.
Over the past 
50 years, we
have had the
continuing
experience of
ever rising
incomes
associated with
no increase 
in happiness
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T
here is a growing body of
evidence that modern
practices of ‘high involvement
management’ increase the
profitability of firms. These techniques –
which seek to engage employees more
fully in their jobs – were first articulated
and advocated by management thinkers in
the early 1980s. But it is only recently 
that economists have realised their impact
on firm performance (Bloom and Van
Reenen, 2010).
High involvement management
presumably improves firm performance
through its impact on employees. But
what does it do for their happiness at
work? Modern management practices
could be beneficial for employees’
wellbeing – by enriching their jobs, by
giving them more autonomy, by rewarding
effort fairly or by building effective
teamwork – or they could be damaging –
by monitoring performance and enforcing
targets in an overbearing way or by
demanding more effort for less pay.
The scant evidence on this question is
mainly based on case studies of particular
occupations or self-selected samples of
employees. Initial studies of high
involvement management indicated clear
productivity improvements but a barely
discernible negative impact on employees’
wellbeing (Appelbaum et al, 2000). A
second generation of studies, however,
paints a more complicated picture.
For example, high involvement
management can enrich people’s work,
leading to improvements in job
satisfaction, but sometimes these come at
the expense of increased absenteeism
(Frick and Simmons, 2011). This is because
greater job demands, which are often
valued by employees, induce stress unless
they are able to tackle demanding tasks in
a fashion that best suits them.
But in many workplaces, job control is
not ceded to employees and, to make
matters worse, the social support from
Wellbeing in 
the workplace:
the impact of modern management
High involvement
management is
associated with
higher job
satisfaction, less
tiredness and a
lower probability
of accidents
How people feel about their jobs is 
an important part of their overall
happiness yet until now, few studies
have explored the links between
employees’ wellbeing and their
working environment. Alex Bryson
and colleagues analyse data from
Finland to assess the impact of
modern management practices on
wellbeing in the workplace.
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which employees might benefit
psychologically – supportive supervision,
for example, or effective union
representation – are also lacking (Wood
and Bryson, 2009).
In a new study, we analyse nationally
representative data for Finland, a country
renowned for being an ‘early mover’ in
high involvement management. It is also a
country whose work practices are located
within a wage structure and industry mix
that, one might imagine, would be
conducive to ‘work enriching’ high
involvement management rather than
being geared towards labour
intensification.
Our survey asked employees which
practices they are exposed to in their job,
including autonomous teamwork,
performance-based incentive pay,
systematic training and information-
sharing by management. We estimate 
the effects of these practices on accidents
in the workplace and three measures 
of wellbeing:
 Sickness absences, both 
short- and long-term.
 Subjective wellbeing – that is, self-
reported job satisfaction, work capacity,
state of health and feelings of tiredness.
 Physical discomfort at work, as
measured by the experience of pain in
four different parts of the body: the
lumbar region, legs, arms and neck.
In seeking to identify any causal linkage
between high involvement management
and employees’ wellbeing, the chief
obstacle is non-random exposure to high
involvement management. It is likely that
those who do not feel up to high
involvement will simply avoid it, potentially
biasing any positive association between
high involvement management and
wellbeing.
We are able to overcome this problem
with very rich data on employee absence
and earning patterns that go back eight
years prior to the survey. We are thus able
to account for patterns and incidence of
prior sickness absence, thus ensuring that
our estimates are not simply a product of
employee selection.
We find that high involvement
management is positively associated with
various aspects of employees’ wellbeing.
In particular, it is strongly associated with
higher evaluations of subjective wellbeing,
including higher job satisfaction and fewer
feelings of tiredness at work. It is also
associated with a lower probability of
having a workplace accident.
But high involvement management is
also associated with having more short
absence spells. This may be because
working in such a system is more
demanding than standard production and
because multi-skilled employees cover for
each other’s short absences.
So the nature of high involvement
management appears to be important for
employees’ wellbeing, but it is not the
only aspect of modern management that
influences wellbeing. Another is the way
in which new practices are introduced.
What appears to matter here is employee
involvement in the process of consultation
and negotiation leading to change.
In a separate study of UK data, we
find that organisational change is
positively associated with increased job-
related anxiety, but this anxiety is absent
where employees are covered by a union
involved in organisational changes (Bryson
et al, 2012). Where employees are not
covered by a union, however, the anxiety
effects of high involvement management
are still apparent, even if they are involved
in consultation over change.
Overall, this body of research indicates
the potential benefits of high involvement
management for firms, but it also shows
that there are circumstances in which it
can have negative effects on employees’
wellbeing. In trying to minimise these
costs, firms should consider not only what
combination of practices will improve
performance, but also how best to
introduce those practices and monitor the
effects on their workforce.
This article summarises ‘Does High
Involvement Management Improve Worker
Wellbeing?’ by Petri Böckerman, Alex Bryson
and Pekka Ilmakunnas, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 1095 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp1095.pdf).
Petri Böckerman is at the Labour Institute
for Economic Research, Helsinki. Alex
Bryson of the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research is a visiting research
fellow in CEP’s labour markets programme.
Pekka Ilmakunnas is at Aalto University
School of Economics.
Further reading
Eileen Appelbaum, Thomas Bailey, Peter Berg
and Arne Kalleberg (2000) Manufacturing
Advantage: Why High-performance Work
Systems Pay Off, Cornell University Press
Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (2010)
‘Human Resource Management and
Productivity’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 982
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0982.pdf)
Alex Bryson, Harald Dale-Olsen and Erling
Barth (2012) ‘Do Higher Wages Come at a
Price?’, Journal of Economic Psychology
33(1): 251-63, earlier version available 
as ‘How Does Innovation Affect Worker
Wellbeing?’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 953
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0953.pdf) 
Bernd Frick and Rob Simmons (2011) 
‘The Hidden Costs of High Performance Work
Practices: Evidence from a Large German
Steel Company’, mimeo
Stephen Wood and Alex Bryson (2009) ‘High
Involvement Management’, in The Evolution
of the Modern Workplace edited by William
Brown, Alex Bryson, John Forth and Keith
Whitfield, Cambridge University Press
Firms should
monitor the
effects of new
management
practices on 
their workforce
In some
circumstances,
high involvement
management 
can have
negative effects
on employees’
wellbeing
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In 2006, the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary heard
evidence from two sources on the economic cost of crime.
The director of the Bureau of Crime Statistics told the
committee that according to surveys, the financial cost of
crime to victims and their families is $16 billion annually.
Immediately afterwards, economist Jens Ludwig told the
committee that, based on survey respondents’ willingness
to pay to reduce crime in their communities, the cost of
crime is $694 billion per year.
This 40-fold disparity between the direct costs to victims
and the wider community’s willingness to pay to reduce
crime suggests an intriguing notion. What if most of the
social cost of crime is not endured by victims but by 
non-victims? What if the financial impact of crime on
those who are killed, assaulted or robbed is just the tip of
the iceberg for calculating the costs of crime?
The idea that the costs of crime for non-victims may be
important was noted by Jeremy Bentham as long
ago as the late eighteenth century. He gave the
example of a man who is robbed on a road,
where the ‘primary mischief’ arises from the
physical harm and loss of possessions
occurring from the robbery, but the crime
also has a ‘secondary mischief’:
‘The report of this robbery circulates
from hand to hand, and spreads
itself in the neighbourhood. It finds
its way into the newspapers, and is propagated
over the whole country. Various people, on this
occasion, call to mind the danger which they and
their friends, as it appears from this example,
stand exposed to in travelling; especially such as
may have occasion to travel the same road.’ 
What is important about this effect of crime – which
Bentham referred to as ‘the alarm’ – is that it affects a
much larger number of people than the direct impact of
crime. As philosopher Jonathan Wolff pointed out in the
2005 Bentham lecture at University College London, even
if the probability of harm is very low, ‘the fear can be
ever-present for a great number of people, depressing
their lives’. The cost of crime may therefore be far larger
Crime and mental wellbeing
Crime has clear costs for its victims, but it might also cause considerable harm to
other local people who fear being victims in the future. Francesca Cornaglia and
Andrew Leigh measure the impact of crime on the mental wellbeing of both
victims and non-victims, as well as the effects of crime reporting by local media.
in brief...
Increases in 
crime rates have 
a negative impact 
on the mental
wellbeing of 
local residents
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than commonly suggested by methods that evaluate only
the effects on victims and their immediate family.
In a new study, we combine detailed crime statistics with
panel survey data that provide detailed indicators of
mental wellbeing for the same people over a six-year
period, 2001-06. The ‘Household, Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia’ (HILDA) survey combines measures
of respondents’ tiredness, difficulties with work and social
activities because of physical or emotional problems, and
nervousness and depression into an overall indicator called
the Mental Component Summary (MCS).
The HILDA data also include information on which people
have been crime victims. This makes it possible to examine
separately the effects that changes in crime in a local area
have on changes in the mental wellbeing of resident
victims and non-victims (controlling for changes in local
economic conditions).
There is a particular analytical challenge involved in
investigating the effects of being a victim of crime on
people’s mental wellbeing: the possibility of ‘sorting’ –
that certain people who are more likely to be victims of
crime may at the same time experience lower mental
wellbeing. As far as we know, no previous study has been
able to estimate the effects of different crimes on the
mental wellbeing of victims, taking account of the
potential selection of vulnerable individuals into incidences
of crime.
Our analysis finds a strong relationship between being a
victim of crime and mental wellbeing for both property
crimes and violent crimes: a seven percentage point fall in
the MCS for these people. Taking account of the potential
selection of vulnerable individuals suggests that sorting is
indeed a problem. Nevertheless, we still find a
considerable impact on mental wellbeing (a two
percentage point fall in the MCS), which is predominantly
driven by being a victim of a violent crime.
Turning to non-victims, we find significant and sizeable
effects of violent crime on the mental wellbeing of non-
victims in the local area. Distinguishing between different
categories of violent crime, it seems that these effects are
driven by incidences of assaults, including sexual assault,
and robbery. Thus, these results provide evidence for the
hypothesis that by reducing the wellbeing of non-victims,
the costs of crime may be substantial.
We also examine the role of local media coverage in
enhancing the effect on mental wellbeing of crime rates
within an area. Extensive coverage of crime incidences in
local newspapers may exacerbate the effect of criminal
activity on the mental wellbeing of non-victims. To our
knowledge, no previous work has quantified such effects
nor, more importantly, assessed the ‘multiplier’ effect of
area crime through media coverage on mental wellbeing.
We find that the intensity of reporting of crime increases
its negative effect on mental wellbeing. This suggests that
media reporting plays an important role in enhancing the
negative effect of crime on non-victims in the local area.
This article summarises ‘Crime and Mental Wellbeing’ by
Francesca Cornaglia and Andrew Leigh, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 1049 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1049.pdf).
Francesca Cornaglia is a research associate in CEP’s labour
markets and wellbeing programmes and a lecturer at Queen
Mary, University of London. Andrew Leigh, a former professor
of economics at the Australian National University, is a
member of the Australian House of Representatives.
Local media
coverage of
criminal activity
enhances the
negative effect 
of crime on
wellbeing
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Ofsted inspections of schools have been a
central feature of state education in England for
nearly 20 years. Research by Iftikhar Hussain
explores the validity of the school ratings that
Ofsted produces, the impact of a fail rating on
subsequent pupil performance and the extent to
which teachers can ‘game’ the system.
School 
inspections:
can we trust Ofsted reports?
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H
ow to ensure that teachers,
doctors and other public
sector employees act in the
best interests of the users of
public services is a challenge facing
governments around the world. Many
have responded by making increased use
of objective performance targets, such as
pupil test scores for schools and patient
waiting times for hospitals.
Empirical evidence suggests that
organisations given incentives to perform
on such measures often ‘game’ the
system, subverting the intention behind
the target. For example, schools might try
to raise their average test score by
excluding lower ability pupils from the
test. Or when given a target for pupils to
attain a certain level in key stage tests,
teachers might focus on pupils on 
the margin of this achievement level, 
at the expense of both high and low
ability pupils.
In England, and in the UK more
broadly, top-down performance targets
have often been complemented by
inspection regimes. Examples include the
school inspection system run by Ofsted
(the Office for Standards in Education), 
and the Care Quality Commission for the
healthcare sector. In fact, the UK is
something of a world leader in the area 
of inspections.
The subjective nature of the
performance evaluation undertaken by
inspectors holds the promise of
‘measuring what matters’. But inspections
may open up a whole new can of worms.
In particular, just like targets, inspections
are top-down and, what’s more, the
officials who lead them may be prone to
biases and prejudices. Left to their own
devices to exercise judgement as they 
see fit, it is unclear whether inspectors will
act in the best interest of pupils and
parents. Neither pro- nor anti- inspection
arguments have been backed by hard
empirical evidence and this research seeks
to remedy this gap. 
New evidence on 
inspection systems
In the absence of previous empirical
evidence – from the UK or elsewhere – this
study uses the case of Ofsted inspections
of state schools in England to provide
some evidence on the effectiveness of such
subjective performance evaluation systems.
The first question addressed is whether
inspection ratings provide any extra
information on school quality, over and
above what is already available in the
public sphere.
This ‘validity test’ is implemented as
follows: are inspection ratings correlated
with underlying school quality measures –
constructed from teenage pupils’ survey
reports of teacher practices as well as
parental satisfaction – after controlling for
standard observable school characteristics,
such as test score rankings and the
proportion of pupils eligible for free school
meals? If they are, then inspection ratings
have the potential to play an important
role in providing information for parents
considering which school they would like
their children to attend.
The next question addressed is
whether pupil test scores improve
following a fail inspection. This is a thorny
empirical problem because it suffers from
the classic problem of ‘mean reversion’ –
the idea that a failed school’s test
performance would have improved
(reverted to the mean) even in the absence
of a fail inspection.
Relatedly, whether schools are able to
game the system and artificially boost
performance following a fail inspection is
also addressed. The post-fail incentives to
game are strong and the prior evidence –
from England and elsewhere – suggests
that when teachers are put under pressure
to raise pupil test scores, they may well
resort to such strategies. 
The nature of Ofsted school
inspections
Broadly speaking, Ofsted inspections of
schools have three main objectives: first, to
offer feedback and advice to the head and
other teachers; second, to provide
information to parents to aid their
decision-making; and third, to identify
schools that suffer from ‘serious
weakness’.
Over the period covered by my
research (2005/6 to 2008/9), schools were
generally inspected once during an
inspection cycle. An inspection involves an
assessment of a school’s performance on
academic and other measured outcomes,
Inspections
produce ratings
that can help
parents
distinguish
between more
and less 
effective schools
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this issue, I exploit a design feature of the
English primary schools’ testing system to
solve this mean reversion problem. Key
stage 2 tests for Year 6 (age 11) pupils are
administered in the second week of May
in each year. These tests are marked
externally, and results are released to
schools and parents in mid-July.
The window between May and July
allows me to address the issue of mean
reversion: schools failed in June are failed
after the test in May but before inspectors
know the outcome of the tests. Thus the
May test outcome for these schools is not
affected by the subsequent fail; neither do
inspectors select them for failure on the
basis of this outcome.
By comparing schools failed early in the
academic year – September, say – with
schools failed in June of the same academic
year, I can isolate mean reversion from the
effect of the fail inspection. If there is any
rebound in test scores independent of the
fail inspection, we should see it in the
schools failed in June. As a check on this
approach, a comparison of observable
characteristics prior to the fail rating for
schools failed in June (the ‘control’ group)
and schools failed in the early part of the
academic year (the ‘treatment’ group)
reveals negligible differences between the
two groups.
The results show that a fail inspection
leads to significant improvements in test
scores. Furthermore, the largest gains are
for pupils scoring low on the prior (age 7)
followed by an on-site visit to the school.
For the visit, inspectors arrive at the
school at very short notice (no more than
a few days), which in theory should enable
them to see the school as it ‘really is’ and
limit disruptive ‘window dressing’ in
preparation for the inspections. During the
inspection, the inspectors collect
qualitative evidence on performance and
practices at the school. This involves
classroom observations, in-depth
interviews with the school leadership,
examination of pupils’ work as well as
discussions with pupils and parents.
At the end of this process, the school
is given an explicit headline inspection
rating – 1 (outstanding), 2 (good), 3
(satisfactory) or 4 (unsatisfactory, also
known as a fail rating) – and the
inspection report is made available to
parents and posted on the internet.
Do inspection ratings 
convey any new information
on quality?
Previous research suggests that inspectors’
findings are reliable, in that two inspectors
independently observing the same lesson
will come to very similar judgements about
the quality of classroom teaching. The
issue addressed here is whether inspection
ratings are also valid, in the sense of being
correlated with underlying measures of
school quality not observed by the
inspectors. There is almost no empirical
evidence on this question.
I construct a measure of underlying
school quality from 14-year-old pupils’
survey responses to questions about
teacher behaviour and practices. 
These data come from the Longitudinal
Survey of Young People in England, a
major survey supported by the
Department for Education.
The survey asks six questions on how
likely teachers are to: take action when a
pupil breaks rules; make pupils work to
their full capacity; keep order in class; set
homework; check that any homework that
is set is done; and mark pupils’ work.
Further analysis using pupils’ reports of
school discipline as well as parents’ reports 
of satisfaction levels yields very similar
results to those reported here for the
teacher practices outcome.
A composite pupil-level score of
teacher practices at the school is computed
by taking the average of the responses to
these six questions. The validity test is then
undertaken by asking the following
question: can inspection ratings help
distinguish between (or forecast) schools
with good and poor teacher practices?
The critical issue is whether inspection
ratings summarise information about
underlying school quality that is not
already available in the public sphere. My
findings demonstrate that on this measure
at least, inspectors appear to be doing a
reasonable job. Even after controlling for
things like test scores and the socio-
economic background of pupils, inspection
ratings appear to have substantial power in
predicting underlying quality.
These results suggest that parents who
are looking for a good school ought to
place at least some weight on inspection
ratings. The actual weight will depend in
part on how much information parents
already have about the relevant schools,
beyond publicly available information such
as test scores.
The effect of a fail inspection
Turning to the effects of a fail rating on a
school’s future test scores, the data show
that pupils’ performance on key stage
tests improves following a fail inspection.
But whether this is a consequence of the
fail inspection or simply a bounce back
after a year or two’s bad luck is a difficult
question to answer. To make progress on
Children of 
low-income
parents benefit
most from school
inspections
The inspectors
seem able to
identify poorly
performing
schools, leading to
test score gains
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key stage 1 test. The gains are large
compared with the effects of other policy
interventions that pupils might experience,
such as having higher quality teachers 
or attending a school with higher
attainment levels.
These findings are consistent with the
view that the children of low-income
parents – who are, arguably, the least vocal
in holding teachers to account – benefit
the most from inspections. Such evidence
may be especially relevant in the current
policy environment, where first, there is
heightened concern about raising
standards for this group of children, and
second, they are hard to reach using other
policy levers.
Evidence on gaming
behaviour
Finally, this research also looks into possible
strategic behaviour by teachers. I find little
evidence to suggest that schools failed by
the inspectors are able to inflate their
pupils’ test performance by gaming the
system. First, teachers do not exclude low
ability pupils from the test-taking pool.
Second, although the evidence on
whether teachers target pupils on the
margin of attaining the official proficiency
level (level 4 on the key stage 2 test) is
mixed, I find no evidence to suggest that
some groups (say, very low or very high
ability pupils) are adversely affected by the
fail inspection.
Third, although test gains fade
somewhat over time, there is evidence to
suggest that for some pupils, the gains last
into the medium term, even after they
have left the failed primary school. This
suggests that teachers inculcate real
learning and not just test-taking skills in
response to the fail rating.
These findings on strategic behaviour
are in stark contrast to a significant body
of evidence demonstrating dysfunctional
responses to test-based performance
evaluation in other settings. My
interpretation of these results is that by
subjecting schools to close scrutiny,
inspectors may play an important role in
limiting such distortionary activities.
Conclusions
What are the broader lessons from this
study? The findings are particularly
noteworthy given the indications from past
research that subjective assessments may
give rise to various biases. For example,
there is evidence to suggest that subjective
evaluations of workers may lead to
‘leniency’ and ‘centrality’ bias in private
firms (Prendergast, 1999). And evidence
from the public sector points to staff
indulging their preferences when allowed
to exercise discretion rather than following
formal rules (Heckman et al, 1996).
Although such biases in school
inspectors’ behaviour cannot be ruled out,
this research demonstrates that the
inspection system appears to be effective
along the following two dimensions: first,
inspectors produce ratings that make it
easier to distinguish between more and less
effective schools; and second, they are able
to identify poorly performing schools,
leading to test score gains.
One important feature of the English
school inspection system is that the key
output produced by the inspectors – an
inspection rating and report – is available
for public consumption on the internet.
Consequently, inspectors’ decisions are
themselves subject to scrutiny and
oversight. One hypothesis for future
research is that this is a key element 
in driving the positive results found in 
this study.
This article summarises ‘Subjective
Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector:
Evidence from School Inspections?’ 
by Iftikhar Hussain, Centre for the Economics
of Education Discussion Paper No. 135
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/ceedp135.pdf).
Iftikhar Hussain is a lecturer in economics
at the University of Sussex and a research
associate in CEP’s programme on education
and skills.
Further reading
James Heckman, Jeffrey Smith and
Christopher Taber (1996) ‘What Do
Bureaucrats Do? The Effects of Performance
Standards and Bureaucratic Preferences on
Acceptance into the JTPA Program’, in
Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship,
Innovation and Growth, Volume 7 edited by
Gary Libecap, JAI Press 
Canice Prendergast (1999) ‘The Provision of
Incentives in Firms’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 37(1): 7-63
By subjecting 
schools to close
scrutiny, inspectors 
can play an
important role in
limiting teachers’
ability to ‘game’
the system
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The impact of discrimination against particular social
groups has been widely analysed for its effects on people’s
access to jobs, housing and education. Yet perceptions of
discrimination also matter. For example, given that job
search takes time and effort, applicants who believe that
potential employers are likely to discriminate against them
may not apply for those jobs. Similarly, pupils who believe
that their efforts will not be rewarded may disengage and
thereby reduce their chances of making progress.
How can we measure perceptions of discrimination?
Asking individuals directly can provide some information,
but it is difficult to infer strong conclusions from such
questionnaires. Stated perceptions may differ from what
actual behaviour reveals.
Our research brought experimental economics to 1,200
pupils in 29 schools across England. Pupils were given an
endowment – equivalent to the average weekly pocket
money in England – and could either keep this
endowment or ‘invest’ it in an exam that would be
marked by either their teacher or an anonymous external
examiner. If the exam answers were right, pupils could
double their weekly pocket money.
The crux of the experiment is that pupils invested their
money in the exam only if they believed that their chances
of doubling their investment were large. We asked pupils
a number of questions about the school and their
teachers that allowed us to single out money as the main
driver of their decisions. For example, pupils who believed
Pupils’ progress:
how children’s perceptions 
influence their efforts
What is the impact of a pupil’s perceptions of how their teachers
will treat them on their motivation, efforts and educational
achievements? To explore this question, Amine Ouazad and
Lionel Page have conducted an experiment in which school
children could use pocket money to place small bets on their
performance in an exam.
in brief...
Experimental research
suggests that boys tend
to lower their effort
when a female teacher
marks their exams
that a good relationship with the teacher matters were no
more likely to invest more.
The results of the experiment show that male pupils
tended to lower their investment when a female teacher
marked their exams. Further analysis confirmed that
female teachers in the experiment did tend to award
lower marks to male pupils than external examiners. So
male pupils’ perceptions seem to be roughly in line with
female teachers’ marking practices. Our results suggest
that male pupils believe that their chances of getting an
answer right are three percentage points lower when
marked by a female teacher than when marked by an
external examiner.
Female pupils tended to increase their investment when a
male teacher marked their exams. Further analysis,
however, showed that male teachers tended to reward
female pupils no better than external examiners. Our
results suggest that female pupils believe that their
chances of getting an answer right are six percentage
points higher when marked by a male teacher than when
marked by an external examiner. Overall, female pupils’
perceptions were not in line with teachers’ marking
practices: in fact, male teachers tended to reward male
pupils more than external examiners.
We also find that ethnicity and socio-economic status 
(as indicated by eligibility for free school meals) did not
play a role in pupil or teacher behaviour. Gender was 
the most important driving force behind the results. 
This is somewhat surprising given the large body of
research devoted to teacher biases along ethnic or socio-
economic lines.
We also wanted to confront our analytical method with
the traditional method, which directly asks pupils about
their perceptions. In our experiments, many pupils said
they believed that ‘ethnic minorities have equal
opportunities at school’ – and pupils who stated it
strongly invested more.
What should we make of these striking results? Our exam
mainly involved verbal skills, for which there is a
substantial gender gap in favour of girls.
Underachievement and dropping out of school are a
specifically male problem, and this experiment sheds new
light on the determinants of this gender gap. Boys often
disengage in the educational process, and this is likely to
be due in part to their perceptions of their teachers.
In this context, it is notable that, in our experiments, male
teachers induced more investment by boys. There is an
under-representation of male teachers in both primary and
secondary education in England. In primary schools, only
15% of teachers are male.
More generally, the experiments reveal that there is no
specific reason why individuals’ perceptions should be in
line with actual discriminatory practices. Individuals may
hold the wrong beliefs about the nature of discrimination.
And even if they get it roughly right, they may
overestimate or underestimate the extent of biases.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the discriminatory
behaviour of some individuals – here, male teachers
favouring male pupils – has a direct consequence for the
population discriminated against – here, female pupils
exert more effort when assessed by a male teacher. 
This could be true in other contexts. The experimental
design can be applied to job applications, dating, property
searches and many other situations. Just by providing
monetary incentives, a researcher can observe perceptions
of discrimination directly from individuals’ behaviour
rather than from their stated perceptions. When money is
at stake, people start calculating the costs and benefits of
their actions and reveal what they truly believe rather than
what they say they believe.
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This article summarises ‘Students’
Perceptions of Teacher Biases:
Experimental Economics in Schools’ 
by Amine Ouazad and Lionel Page,
Centre for the Economics of 
Education Discussion Paper No. 133
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/ceedp133.pdf).
Amine Ouazad, an assistant professor at
INSEAD, is a research associate in CEP’s
education and skills programme.
Lionel Page is a research fellow at the
Queensland Institute of Technology.
Girls have better perceptions of
male teachers – but male
teachers do not reward them
more than female teachers
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The returns to lobbying
Last autumn’s resignation of Liam Fox, the UK’s defence minister,
put lobbying back in the spotlight. Research by Mirko Draca and
colleagues on Washington’s ‘revolving door’ lobbyists gives an
indication of the value of political connections in the UK.
in brief...
The resignation of cabinet minister Liam Fox in October
2011 was yet another challenge to public confidence in
the UK’s political system. It followed revelations about the
expenses of members of parliament (MPs), controversy
over the political power of Rupert Murdoch’s News
International, and severe criticism of former Labour
cabinet ministers over the ‘cabs for hire’ lobbying scandal.
But what can we feasibly say about the returns to
lobbying activity in the UK? Our study of the value of
political connections in Washington looked at the
revenues of US lobbyists who were previously employed
by senators. These ‘politically connected’ lobbyists suffered
a 24% fall in revenues when the senator that they used to
work for left office. This fall in revenue was worth about
$177,000 in business and represents the value of a
connection to a sitting legislator. 
This figure can be used as something of a benchmark for
calculating the value of being connected to a serving UK
cabinet minister. Like senators, cabinet ministers have a
lot of strategic power in policy-making and they
seem to be the main target of lobbying
activity in the UK political system.
Applying our US estimates directly
suggests that the median return to
a high-level UK connection could be
around £122,000 per year. But it has
to be said that our estimate is
speculative. This is because there is no
serious, publicly reported data on
lobbying in the UK. We cannot
conduct the same type of research here
because there is no UK equivalent of
the US Lobbying Disclosure Act.
In practice, the UK lobbying industry is likely to be much
smaller than the US industry, which is worth $3 billion
annually. This is partly because there is less voting along
party lines in the US Congress and representatives are
therefore more open to influence from lobbyists. In the
Connections to a UK
cabinet minister could be
worth up to £122,000 a year
for a working lobbyist
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‘Revolving Door Lobbyists’ by Jordi Blanes i Vidal,
Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen is
forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
It was published as CEP Discussion Paper No. 993 
in August 2010 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0993.pdf).
Jordi Blanes i Vidal is a lecturer in LSE’s
management department and a CEP research
associate. Mirko Draca is a CEP research economist.
Christian Fons-Rosen is an assistant professor at
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. All are part of CEP’s
research programme on productivity and innovation.
Transparency in the UK needs to embrace
the US model, where each lobbying
contract is reported on a quarterly basis
UK, cabinet ministers (rather than non-cabinet MPs) are
the focus of lobbying because of their direct
decision-making power.
The types of returns to connections seen in the United
States are therefore most likely to be concentrated at the
cabinet level. The figure of $177,000 also relates to
middle ranking lobbyists. At the upper end of the US
industry, ‘superstar’ lobbyists will have practices worth
about $1.5 million per year and a single senate-level
connection would then be worth $370,000.
The scale of the business dealings of Adam Werritty, Liam
Fox’s associate, suggests that the return to cabinet-level
access in the UK could also be very high. That said,
Werritty’s case is unusual because it appears that he was
functioning as a lobbyist and as a political adviser at the
same time. This would have been difficult to achieve in
the more transparent US and Canadian systems.
This underscores the need for a UK Lobbying Disclosure
Act. Furthermore, transparency in the UK needs to go
beyond a simple ‘register’ of lobbyists – the main current
proposal – and embrace the US model, where each
lobbying contract is reported on a quarterly basis.
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When governments try to makea decision on big transportprojects, the most desirable
starting point is a cost-benefit analysis,
which carefully assesses whether, and by
how much, the benefits to the country will
outweigh the costs. Traditionally, these
analyses have taken a rather narrow focus,
looking at the direct user benefits – that
is, the benefits to people making journeys.
In the case of the HS2 high-speed rail
link between London and the North, these
benefits – faster journeys, less disruption,
more capacity – are potentially large.
Unfortunately, so are the costs – and both
the costs and benefits are highly
uncertain. 
Supporters of the scheme think that
the costs of HS2 are being overstated by
focusing on the total costs and ignoring
the split between revenues and subsidies.
They say that fares would reduce the costs
to the government from around £30
billion to £17 billion.
Opponents of the scheme think that
the benefits – estimated at around £47
billion – are being overstated because they
are partly calculated by turning time
savings on HS2 into money by ‘valuing’
the time that people would save. The
problem with this, they argue, is that the
number used to value time savings is too
high because it assumes that people are
unproductive on trains.
Some supporters don’t disagree on
this point, but they think that the benefits
are understated because the number of
passengers will be higher than predicted.
They argue that HS2 uses conservative
numbers for passenger growth. There are
railway experts, however, that think that
HS2 has overstated passenger growth by
using projections from more recent years,
when the growth of passenger numbers
has been high.
In short, there is plenty to argue about
even if one focuses narrowly on these
direct user benefits and costs. But as
anyone who has been following the
debate will know, the arguments do not
just focus on these narrow issues.
Unfortunately, the wider costs and
benefits of HS2 are, if anything, even
more uncertain.
Public debate continues to rage about the
decision to build a new high-speed rail line
from London to Birmingham (and possibly
beyond). In the latest in our series on policies 
of the coalition government, Henry Overman
considers some of the arguments for and
against the scheme – and indicates why it has
been so controversial.
HS2:
assessing the costs 
and benefits
Take, for example, the claim by the
transport secretary, writing in the
Telegraph to mark the end of the public
consultation, that high-speed rail is ‘the
fast track fix for bridging the North-South
divide’. This is a clever, but completely
misleading, headline. The article itself is
more tempered – ‘tackling a divide that
has lasted for generations is no easy task’
– but it still makes big claims for the
potential impact of high-speed rail.
These claims rely on the assumption
that reducing journey times (and
increasing capacity) will help firms and
workers in the North to compete more
effectively for market share in the South
(or encourage firms and workers to
relocate). But HS2 will also give firms in
the South better access to markets in the
North. In line with this informal intuition,
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman and other
researchers working on the so-called ‘new
economic geography’ have shown that
reducing transport costs between ‘core’
(the South) and ‘periphery’ (the North)
may actually increase disparities, not
reduce them. Certainly the evidence on
the direct benefits suggests that these
flow disproportionately to London and the
South East.
What about the environmental
impact? In terms of carbon emissions, the
impacts are not large and could well be
negative. Most of the journeys on high-
speed rail will be additional (or transfers
from other lines). Extra journeys and faster
journeys generally require more energy not
less (especially if people drive to the train
station). There will be some savings on
long distance car trips and domestic air
travel – but the latter will be offset if freed
up slots are used for other flights or if 
HS2 makes getting to Heathrow easier
and so generates additional numbers on
other routes.
The overall impact depends on what is
assumed about how electricity is
generated. Generous assumptions using
average, not marginal, carbon figures
make the numbers look better. The last
time I looked at these numbers, HS2 was
predicting a change in average annual
emissions in a range from -0.41 to +0.44
million tonnes. This is equivalent to just 
+/-0.3% of current annual transport
emissions (and ignores the carbon impact
of construction). So the impacts are not
large and could be negative. 
Other environmental impacts arising
from the need to bulldoze a straight 
high-speed train line through some
beautiful countryside are harder to express
in financial terms. These effects clearly
explain much of the bitter local opposition
from people on the route. Actions to
mitigate them provide yet another
illustration of how costly HS2 could 
prove to be.
For example, the final decision on HS2
was delayed while the transport secretary
decided whether to spend an extra 
£500 million on another tunnel under 
the Chilterns. To put that figure in
perspective, we should note that it is 
three times the amount allocated to local
Both the costs
and benefits 
of HS2 are
potentially large
– but they are
also highly
uncertain
Reducing the costs of transport
between the South and the
North may actually increase
disparities not reduce them
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transport projects by the Autumn 2011
spending review.
Given all these uncertainties, it is not
hard to see why public opinion is so
divided. When the Department for
Transport asked people about HS2 last
year, 47% were in favour of HS2 and 9%
against. That sounds like resounding
support, until one notes that half of the
respondents (50%) agreed that ‘high-
speed rail is £30 billion we cannot afford’
while only a quarter disagreed with this
statement. In short, the public are in
favour of high-speed rail, providing that
they do not have to pay for it. 
The poll is also interesting on the
perceived benefits: 56% of adults agreed
that high-speed rail would be better for
the environment while 63% thought it
would create jobs and growth. As I have
shown, the evidence is fairly weak on the
former claim. And just as with the effects
on the North-South divide, the effects on
jobs and growth, other than the direct
impact of construction, are unknown.
(What’s more, construction jobs are part of
the cost to the economy – a much
misunderstood point.)
The fact that opinion polls highlight
these two ‘benefits’ suggests that most
people don’t know much about the
scheme – which turns out to be true: 42%
say that they know little or not very much
about the scheme, while 47% say they
know nothing.
In short, the costs and benefits of HS2
are large and uncertain. I prefer instead to
focus on the opportunity costs: are there
things that we could be doing with £30
billion that would yield a higher return
than ‘£47 billion’? I think the answer is
almost certainly yes, in both the area of
transport – more intra-city schemes, for
example – and more widely.
On the basis of narrow cost-benefit
analysis, this conclusion is backed up by
the Eddington report, published in 2006.
Comparing the figures for HS2 with those
for projects that the Department for
Transport had on its books at the time of
Eddington suggests that HS2 is, at best, in
the bottom quartile in terms of returns
(and indeed, might be closer to being in
the bottom 10%).
One could say that this is irrelevant
because HS2 has a critical mass that will
deliver wider benefits. But as I have
argued, there is a little evidence to
support this assertion. If critical mass is
important, then we could consider
concentrating a large amount of
investment in particular cities – for
example, Birmingham, London,
Manchester and Newcastle. To the best of
my knowledge, no one has assessed what
such a package would look like in terms
of the wider impacts.
One final objection to my negative
conclusion might be that ‘we have to have
HS2 because of capacity constraints on
the west coast mainline’. Unfortunately, as
the Eddington report showed, by the time
HS2 is completed, there will be a great
deal of congestion all over the transport
network. Other schemes to tackle that
congestion are likely to deliver much
better returns because these aspects are
well captured by traditional cost-benefit
analysis and, as I have indicated, HS2 does
pretty badly on that.
In short, the opportunity costs of HS2
are large. To me, this is the fundamental
issue and the reason why I am personally
sceptical about the merits of the project.
Quite simply, I remain unconvinced that
this is the best way for the government to
spend money. Over the last few years,
none of the assertions to the contrary has
changed my mind that this remains the
central problem with HS2.
Henry Overman is director of the Spatial
Economics Research Centre (SERC), professor
of economic geography at LSE and a research
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
Further discussions of HS2 – and 
many other policy issues around cities,
regions, transport, housing and the
environment – are available on the SERC blog:
http://spatial-economics.blogspot.com/
Disclosure: Henry Overman sits on the 
HS2 analytical challenge panel and has
received funding from the Department for
Transport to look at the wider impacts of
transport investment.
The
opportunity
costs of 
HS2 are 
large: it is
unlikely that 
this is the
best way 
for the
government
to spend
money
T
he most striking thing about
the recent volatility of global
financial markets is that
politicians are making the
news. The actions of policy-makers and
their statements about budgets, bailouts
and regulatory reforms are driving the
stock market gyrations. 
This is not normal. Before the financial
crisis of 2008, stock markets usually
moved in response to economic news.
Strong GDP and employment figures
would send the markets soaring. Poor
corporate earnings would send the
markets crashing. 
But today, all eyes are on the policy-
makers. Unfortunately, they cannot agree,
which is generating massive uncertainty. In
fact, according to our new index, which
charts the evolution of US economic policy
uncertainty since 1985, it is now close to
its all-time high (see Figure 1). This policy
uncertainty is a key factor stalling the
recovery and threatening a return to
recession.
We construct our index of policy
uncertainty by combining three types of
information: the frequency of newspaper
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The damaging impact of economic uncertainty 
on growth has been reasonably well studied – but
what happens when there is uncertainty about
economic policy-making? Nicholas Bloom 
and colleagues have developed a measure of 
this distinct kind of uncertainty, one that shows
the value of restoring stability to current 
policy actions.
Policy uncertainty:
a new indicator
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Figure 1:
Index of US economic policy uncertainty
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articles that reference economic
uncertainty and the role of policy; the
number of federal tax code provisions that
are set to expire in coming years; and the
extent of disagreement among economic
forecasters about future inflation and
future government spending on goods
and services.
Our index shows sharp spikes in
economic policy uncertainty around major
elections, wars and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. More recently, it spiked sharply
after the Lehman bankruptcy in
September 2008 and the passage of the
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program)
legislation shortly afterwards. It has
remained high ever since, driven by
continuing policy uncertainty around the
2010 US mid-term elections, the US debt
ceiling dispute and the crisis of the
eurozone. 
Of course, policy uncertainty could be
high simply because general economic
uncertainty is also high. To test this view,
we use Google News listings to construct
a broad index of economic uncertainty
and a narrower index focused squarely on
policy uncertainty.
Comparing these two indices reveals
several episodes that involve large spikes
in economic uncertainty but little or no
jump in policy uncertainty (see Figure 2).
Examples include the Asian financial crisis
of 1997 and several bouts of recessionary
fears in the second half of the 1980s. 
In short, the data refute the view that
economic uncertainty necessarily breeds
policy uncertainty.
So why is policy uncertainty so high
now? To identify the drivers of policy
uncertainty, we drill into the Google 
Figure 2:
Economic policy uncertainty and overall
economic uncertainty
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Notes: The overall news-based economic uncertainty index is composed of the monthly 
number of news articles containing ‘uncertain’ or ‘uncertainty’ as well as ‘economic’ or ‘economy’
(scaled by the smoothed number containing ‘today’).
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Recent policy
uncertainty has
emerged from
the US debt
ceiling dispute
and the 
eurozone crisis
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What makes policy uncertainty so
harmful? When businesses are uncertain
about taxes, healthcare costs and
regulatory initiatives, they adopt a
cautious stance. Because it is costly to
make a hiring or investment mistake,
many businesses naturally wait for calmer
times to expand. If too many businesses
wait to expand, the recovery never takes
off. Weak investments in capital goods,
product development and worker training
also undermine longer-run growth.
How much near-term improvement
could we expect from a stable, certainty-
enhancing policy regime? We use
techniques developed by Christopher
Sims, one of the two 2011 Nobel
laureates in economics, to estimate the
effects of economic policy uncertainty.
The results for the United States
suggest that restoring 2006 (pre-crisis)
News listings and quantify the mix of
factors at work. Several factors underlie
the high levels of US policy uncertainty in
2010 and 2011, but monetary and tax
issues predominate.
One clear example involves the 
Bush-era income tax cuts originally set to
expire at the end of 2010. Democrats and
Republicans adopted opposing positions
about whether to reverse these tax 
cuts. Rather than resolve the uncertainty
in advance, Congress waited till the 
final hour before deciding to extend the
tax cuts.
Other examples include recent moves
in the US Senate to increase tariffs on
Chinese imports, which threaten to set off
a trade war. And in Europe, the continuing
debates over potential bailouts for
countries and banks contribute to a
climate of policy uncertainty. 
This article summarises ‘Measuring 
Economic Policy Uncertainty’ by 
Scott R Baker, Nicholas Bloom and 
Steven J Davis (www.policyuncertainty.com).
Scott R Baker is at Stanford University.
Nicholas Bloom, also at Stanford University,
is a research associate in CEP’s productivity
and innovation programme. Steven J Davis
is at the University of Chicago’s Booth 
School of Business.
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Figure 3:
US production and employment after a policy
uncertainty shock
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Restoring 
pre-crisis levels
of policy
uncertainty could
boost production
and employment
significantly 
levels of policy uncertainty could increase
industrial production by 4% and
employment by 2.5 million jobs over 
18 months (see Figure 3). That would 
not be enough to create a booming
economy, but it would be a big step in 
the right direction.
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On 7 September 2011, a letter from 20 eminent
economists was published by the Financial Times urging
the government to scrap the 50% marginal tax rate on
annual incomes over £150,000 per year introduced in
April 2010. The days that followed saw a flurry of letters
both agreeing and disagreeing with this view. I myself
contributed to it by having a letter published in the FT the
following day.
I do believe it is important for social scientists to come out
of their ivory towers and seek to influence debate about
important issues of public policy. And because the press is
one place where these debates are played out – and the
letters pages the most readily available way to get one’s
ideas some publicity – it is perhaps natural to find
economists writing letters to the newspapers.
But at the same time I have a lot of reservations about
whether debates conducted through letter pages are really
productive. That might seem odd
coming from someone who has
twice in recent years written
letters to the papers.
But rather like my
children, I am
inclined to say
‘they started it’ and
that my letters were
responses to others. I also
believe that it is consistent both
to pen a letter in response to
others and to think
we might all have
been better off not
writing them at all.
Let me explain
the problem.
There is an incentive to write ‘group’ letters to the
newspapers as they get attention. The 50p letter to the FT
was reported in most other UK newspapers, the
subsequent letters expressing disagreement were not.
So if you want to influence policy in some way, then
there is an incentive for making a pre-emptive strike.
And you don’t have to worry too much about
the content of the letter: the authority of these
letters is not really in their content but the
signatories to them. This is probably just as well
as the list of signatories is often much longer
than the body of the letter.
Although it always helps to have someone high profile
on board (DeAnne Julius played that role in the 50p
letter), most of the signatories are probably unknown
even to the highly educated readership of the FT. Sorry
to disappoint those of my colleagues who think being
a famous economist is the same as being famous.
The best-known example of a group letter is the group of
364 economists who wrote to The Times in 1981
expressing their opposition to the policies of the Thatcher
government – as if having one economist opposed for
almost every day of a (non-leap) year made the content of
the letter more compelling.
Given that the debate conducted on the letters pages
often seems to come down to ‘my list is longer than your
list’, it is not surprising that the general public end up
with a rather low opinion of economists. In the case of
the 50p letter, it was less than a week before the FT
published a letter asking ‘can any economist demonstrate
their benefit… without another disputing it?’ What starts
off as a pre-emptive strike by one side ends up in mutually
assured destruction for economists on all sides of the
policy debate.
The letters page
Last autumn, the Financial Times published a series of letters from
economists about the pros and cons of scrapping the 50p tax rate
for high earners. Alan Manning questions the value of
researchers conducting such debates about economic policy
through the pages of newspapers.
in brief...
Academic debates conducted
through newspaper letters pages
are rarely productive
Some of this reaction is a bit silly. Almost all contentious
policy issues are complex with arguments for and against,
rarely with all evidence pointing in one direction. The
maximum length of a letter to the FT is not conducive to a
nuanced discussion of the issues. But the way economists
proceed also asks for such a reaction.
Newspapers will continue to want to publish such letters,
so the only way to improve matters is for some degree of
professional self-regulation. I would like public debate to
be based on the issues not on appeals to authority – so
let’s see an end to group letters. Reducing the number of
signatories would also free up column inches for the
content of the letters. And let’s make sure that we provide
the workings behind our reasoning – not just our
conclusions but why we have arrived at those conclusions.
My main issue with the initial letter on the 50p tax rate
was that it simply consisted of an assertion, and it made
no attempt to provide any serious evidence for its claims.
It set a bad example for how serious economists go about
their business.
What about the substance of the issue: should the UK
retain or abolish the 50p tax rate on the top 1% of
income earners? Here, I am not going to answer that
question because the appropriate way for a professional
economist to proceed is to wait until there is some
evidence on its impact. I think it is fairly clear what the
main issues to look at will be: does the 50p tax rate act as
a sizeable disincentive to work; does it encourage high
earners to live elsewhere; and does it mean that high
earners find ways to evade or avoid paying higher taxes?
We do have existing, though sometimes conflicting,
evidence on related issues in other countries and other
times. But we are going to have to wait for some
evidence on the impact of the 50p tax rate and we should
not pass judgment until that is in – which, according to
recent newspaper reports, may be soon. The evidence
may well be ambiguous but that is the best we will have.
Do I expect economists to adopt my self-denying
ordinance with regard to group letters? I doubt it – self-
regulation rarely works. So I fear I will find myself
continuing to scan the letters pages of the FT ready to
turn to my laptop to tap out another nail in the coffin that
contains the reputation of economists.
CentrePiece Winter 2011/12 
25
Alan Manning is professor of economics at
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on communities.
Economists have an
obligation to provide serious
evidence for their claims
EXPORT
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How do firms break into foreignmarkets? Trade theory tends toemphasise the substantial ‘sunk
costs’ that they have to incur to start
exporting. The implication is that only the
most efficient firms can afford to export.
Yet recent empirical
research drawing on
customs data from several
countries has uncovered
patterns of foreign entry
that seem difficult to
reconcile with high sunk
costs. Many domestic firms
enter foreign markets every year; they
often start selling small quantities to a
single neighbouring country; and almost
half of them stop exporting within a year.
At the same time, new exporters that
survive the first year tend to expand
exports to their initial markets and also
move into other markets.
If entry is so costly, how can we
explain so many firms starting export
activity with so few initial sales and such
low survival rates? And what could explain
the seemingly sequential entry pattern of
the surviving exporters?
Many countries are looking to their export
sectors as a source of future growth, but how do
domestic companies make a success of selling
their output abroad? Research by Emanuel
Ornelas and colleagues finds evidence of
‘sequential exporting’ – firms experimenting in
nearby foreign markets before seeking to
become big exporters.
Sequential exporting:
how firms break into foreign markets
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and distant countries for domestic firms.
When a nearby country lowers its
trade barriers, it attracts exports from
previously purely domestic firms. As these
new exporters learn about their ability to
serve foreign markets, some fail and give
up exporting, whereas others are very
successful and decide to expand into other
foreign destinations. As a result, trade
liberalisation in the nearby country
promotes entry not only there but also in
distant non-liberalising countries, albeit
with a lag.
Similarly, the reduction of trade
barriers in a distant country, by raising the
value of profitably exporting there, also
enhances the value of export
experimentation in nearby markets,
spurring entry into the latter even in the
short run. Once some of the entrants
realise a high export potential from their
experience in the neighbours’ markets,
they move on to the market of the
liberalising distant country.
Our research conjectures that a central
force behind this behaviour is the
uncertainty that firms face about their
own ability to export profitably. Because
the drivers of export success are different
for each firm (they are ‘firm-specific’), they
can only be uncovered when a firm
actually starts exporting. But because they
are uncertain and entry is costly, new
exporters tend to start small to avoid
adding negative variable profits to the
potentially lost sunk costs.
At the same time, because what drives
export success for an individual firm tends
to have ‘global scope’ beyond the first
market it enters, substantial entry costs
lead new exporters typically to enter a
single destination first and then to develop
their export potential. If their performance
is good in the first market, firms will
gradually expand there and pursue
‘sequential exporting’ to other
destinations.
Researchers in international business
have long recognised that export
profitability is uncertain and firm-specific.
For example, an early study shows how
the distinct knowledge and competencies
associated with export success (which are
typically related to product adaptation,
marketing and distribution) are only
acquired by firms once they start 
their foreign operations (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977). 
Previous research has also illustrated
how a company with global scope can
apply knowledge from its initial foreign
operations to new export destinations.
Analysing firms in four emerging export
sectors in Argentina, a recent study
documents how such export-specific
knowledge can be used when accessing
different foreign markets (Artopoulos 
et al, 2011).
Similar reasoning applies to firm-
specific characteristics of demand. For
example, trade facilitation agencies, such
as SITPRO in the UK, stress the importance
of uncovering foreign demand for would-
be exporters, indicating that the key
uncertainty is about persistent
components of demand, some of which
may be present in multiple countries.
Developing our conjecture theoretically
provides a number of novel implications
for the dynamic behaviour patterns of
exporting firms, which we test empirically.
Using firm-level data on all Argentine
manufacturing exports between 2002 and
2007, we find strong evidence that firms’
first foreign destination plays a crucial role
in explaining future patterns of foreign
entry. It is in that first market where firms
learn the most. 
Specifically, as long as a firm continues
to be an exporter, its growth on entry (at
both the intensive margin – sales in the
market – and the extensive margin – the
number of markets served) is significantly
higher in its first foreign market than in
markets it enters subsequently. The
outcome is similar for exit: a firm is more
likely to stop right after entering its first
foreign destination than it is to leave
markets entered subsequently.
But if ‘export experimentation’ is
indeed key, the differential effect of the
first market should not apply universally to
all exporters. For example, if the firm were
to start exporting again after a break,
there would no longer be a fundamental
uncertainty to be uncovered.
Similarly, if a firm starts exporting by
serving multiple markets, it must be
because it is relatively confident about its
export success – so on average the role of
self-discovery should not be as
pronounced for such firms as it is for
single-market entrants. Uncertainty about
export profitability should also be less
marked for producers of homogeneous
goods, for which global reference prices
are available.
In turn, our theory about sequential
exporting suggests that we should observe
rapid first-market export growth, early
entry into additional markets and frequent
early first-market exit primarily among
first-time, single-market exporters of
differentiated products. This is indeed
what we find empirically. 
Hence, while firm-specific uncertainty
is but one possible force shaping firms'
export strategies, our evidence indicates
that it plays an unequivocal role in
explaining sequential exporting. Notice
that our mechanism does not deny the
possibility of a firm’s productivity (and
other characteristics) also shaping its
export behaviour. Even if a firm becomes
more efficient, which will raise the appeal
of exporting, uncertainty about potential
profitability in foreign markets could still
trigger sequential exporting.
The policy implications of a process of
sequential exporting driven by self-
discovery are far-reaching. Consider the
impact of trade liberalisation in nearby
Uncertainty
about their
potential
profitability 
in foreign
markets leads
firms to pursue
‘sequential
exporting’
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Thus, our findings suggest the
existence of a ‘trade externality’: lower
trade barriers in a country induce the entry
of foreign firms into other markets. For
example, trade liberalisation in a distant
but large country A (say, China) can
induce firms from country B (say, the UK)
to start exporting to nearby country C (say,
Germany). This possibility could provide a
novel motive for international coordination
of trade policies, one that strengthens the
rationale for institutions like the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
If the trade externality is stronger at
the regional level, this possibility could 
also help to explain the pattern of free
trade agreements throughout the world. 
Indeed, the impact of trade agreements
could be very distinct from what existing
studies indicate.
For example, a regional trade
agreement can boost export
experimentation by lowering the costs of
accessing the markets of bloc partners. As
a result of more experimentation, a greater
number of domestic firms would eventually
find it profitable to export to countries
outside the bloc. This would generate
‘trade creation’ that is very different from
the concept that economists often
emphasise: in addition to promoting intra-
bloc trade, a regional trading bloc can also
stimulate exports to non-members. 
If the agreement were of the
multilateral type, tracking down its effects
becomes even trickier. Indeed, third-
country and lagged effects of trade
liberalisation may help to
explain the difficulty in
identifying significant trade
effects of multilateral
liberalisation, thus
corroborating well-
entrenched beliefs that the
WTO (and its predecessor,
the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade)
have been crucial in
promoting world trade.
This article summarises ‘Sequential
Exporting’ by Facundo Albornoz, Hector
Calvo Pardo, Gregory Corcos and Emanuel
Ornelas, CEP Discussion Paper No. 974
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0974.pdf).
Facundo Albornoz is at the University of
Birmingham. Hector Calvo-Pardo is at the
University of Southampton. Gregory Corcos
is at the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration. Emanuel Ornelas
is director of CEP’s research programme on
globalisation.
Further reading
Alejandro Artopoulos, Daniel Friel and Juan
Carlos Hallak (2011) ‘Lifting the Domestic
Veil: The Challenges of Exporting
Differentiated Goods Across the Development
Divide’, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 16947
Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977) 
‘The Internationalization Process of the 
Firm – A Model of Knowledge Development
and Increasing Foreign Market
Commitments’, Journal of International
Business Studies 8: 23-32
The process of
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country can
induce the entry
of foreign firms
into other
markets
Trade liberalisation in distant but
large country A (say, China) may
induce firms from country B (say,
the UK) to start exporting to
nearby country C (say, Germany)
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